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INDIANS AND INEQUALITY: A COMMENTARY ON
A.-G. Canada v. Canard
By

DAvID PHILLIPS*

The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canard1 represents the third decision of the Court since 1970 involving a possible conflict
between provisions of the Indian Act2 and section 1 (b) of the CanadianBill
of Rights.3 Unfortunately, Canard does little to clear up the confusion which
has resulted from the first two decisions. Instead, it creates more uncertainty
about the proper application and effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
A.
The dispute in Canardarose when two administrators were successively
appointed to administer the estate of Alexander Canard who was killed in a
traffic accident during July, 1969. Canard, a status Indian under the terms of
the Indian Act, died without leaving a will. The first of the two administrators
to be appointed was William Rees, the local Superintendant of the Indian
Affairs Department, who was named by the Minister of Indian Affairs. The
legal basis for this appointment by the Minister is found in section 42 and 43
of the Indian Act.
Section 42 of the Indian Act gives the Minister "all jurisdiction and
authority in relation to matters and causes testamentary with respect to deceased Indians". Section 43 lists a series of more specific powers which the
Minister may exercise as part of the general grant of authority contained in
the preceding section. Section 43 (a), for instance; allows him to "appoint executors of wills and administrators of estates of deceased Indians, remove them
and appoint others in their stead". Section 44 indicates that the Minister is
not always obliged to exercise this jurisdiction himself for he may consent to
have a testamentary matter referred for decision to the court that would have
had jurisdiction if the deceased were not an Indian. These provisions were enacted by the federal Parliament under section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act which
enables Parliament to legislate in relation to "Indians and Lands Reserved for
Indians". The effect of this legislation has been to oust the application of
provincial intestacy laws to those Indians who are affected by the Indian
Act. If the federal Parliament had not so legislated in respect of intestacy,
then, by virtue of section 88 of the IndianAct, the provincial laws would apply
equally to Indians and non-Indians alike who are resident in the province.
In addition to these provisions of the Indian Act, the federal government
has also enacted the Indian Estate Regulations4 to guide the administra* Mr. Phillips is a member of the 1975 Graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law

School.
'A.G. Can. v. Canard (1975), 52 DL.R. (3d) 548; [1975], 3 W.W.R. 1.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149 (now R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6).
8 S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1970, Appendix m.
4
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tion of the intestacy regime of deceased Indians. These regulations provide,
for instance, that after the death of an Indian, the local Superintendant is to
forward to the Minister an itemized list of all the deceased's assets and
liabilities. In order to perform this task, the Superintendant is to "act in the
capacity of an administrator" in safeguarding the property of the deceased.5
Another regulation permits the Minister "to appoint an officer of the Indian
Affairs Branch to be the administrator of estates and to supervise the administration of estates and of all the assets of deceased Indians". 6
After his appointment by the Minister, Rees subsequently commenced
an action in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench against three defendants
arising from the fatal accident. Apparently, Mrs. Canard was not informed
either that an administrator had been appointed under the terms of the Indian
Act nor that an actions for damages had been brought on behalf of her husband's estate. Instead, Mrs. Canard herself had already applied to the Surrogate Court in her district for letters of administration. These were issued to
her in March, 1970.
When Mrs. Canard discovered that Rees had been appointed the administrator of her husband's estate by the Minister of Indian Affairs, she
began proceedings in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench requesting declaratory judgment that would render her the sole legitimate administrator of
the estate.
She succeeded in her claim in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
by taking advantage of a section of the Indian Act which provided an exemption from its intestacy provisions.1 Section 4(3) states that the intestacy provisions, along with other designated sections of the Indian Act, do not apply
where the Indian does not ordinarily live on a reserve. Matas, J. found, on
the basis of the factual evidence before him, that Canard had not been ordinarily resident on a reserve because at the time of his death he was living
with his family on a farm where he worked for several weeks of the year.
When the case was appealed by the Crown to the Manitoba Court of
Appeal," Dickson, J.A. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of the Court,
reversed the Queen's Bench decision on this point. An examination of the
facts, Dickson, J.A. felt, revealed that Mr. Canard possessed a house on a
reserve to which he intended to return with his family after his summer work
was completed and as such indicated that he was ordinarily resident on a
reserve at the time of his death. Consequently, the intestacy provisions of
the Indian Act did apply to the administration of his estate.
Dickson, J.A. also rejected a second argument put forward by counsel
for Mrs. Canard that sections 42 and 43 were ultra vires the federal Parliament because the effect of the provisions was to oust the jurisdiction of a
provincial court. Dickson, J.A. acknowledged that this was indeed the effect
5 Id., Reg. 4.
6 ld., Reg. 11.
7 Supra, note 2, s. 4(3).
8 (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 678.
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resulting from the operation of these sections but he found appropriate legislative authority in section 101 of the B.N.A. Act which grants to Parliament
the power to establish courts "for the better Administration of the Laws of
Canada". He concluded that the term could be construed to include the situation in which jurisdiction had been transferred from a provincial court to a
federal Minister of the Crown.
Nevertheless, Dickson, J.A. did finally dismiss the Crown's appeal on
the basis of a third argument advanced by counsel for Mrs. Canard that
section 43 of the Indian Act denied Mrs. Canard equality of the Bill of Rights.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada before a seven member
panel, all three of Mrs. Canard's arguments were considered. The Court unanimously dismissed the first two upholding Dickson, J.A. on those points.
Laskin, CJ. neatly summarized the attitude of members of the Court when
he said in his judgment: "The only point for serious consideration in this
appeal is whether any of the prescriptions of the CanadianBill of Rights are
offended by certain provisions of the Indian Act. .
B.
The Canard decision can be analyzed in terms of three recurring issues
which arise whenever the possible application of section 1 (b) of the Bill of
Rights is considered. These are the meaning of "equality before the law", the
test for "inequality", and the question of whether a perceived inequality can
be justified by a reasonable discrimination qualification.
The discussion in Canard centered on the second of these three issues
mainly because Canard presented a new type of problem in the application
of s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights. The nature of this problem can be illustrated
by examining the structure of analysis whenever an issue involving s. 1 (b) of
the Bill of Rights comes before a court.
Before section 1 (b) can be given any operative effect, there must first
be a finding by the court of an inequality before the law. The determination
of whether or not an inequality exists obliges the court to undertake some
form of comparison or balancing of rights under the law. The court enters
into an inquiry in which it examines and weighs the rights accorded to one
group in relation to a specific matter against the rights accorded to another
group in relation to the same matter. When faced with this task of weighing
or balancing rights under the law, the court must always be concerned with
the appropriate method of comparison to be employed as the basis for a test
of inequality. This concern with the method of comparison arises primarily
from the fact that the Bill of Rights exists as a federal statute and its application is limited to statutes passed by the federal Parliament.
In the two previous decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with section
1 (b) of the Bill of Rights and the Indian Act, the method of comparison
consisted of balancing the rights emanating from federal legislation.. In
9Supra, note 1 at 551 (D.L.R.); 3 (W.W.R.).
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Drybones,10 the Court compared a liquor ordinance of the Northwest Territories with section 94(b) of the Indian Act as these provisions would affect
a person intoxicated in a private place. The Court perceived an inequality
under the law because whereas it was an offence for an Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve wherever he may be, a non-Indian would be committing
an offence only if he were found intoxicated in a public place.
In Lavell the Court considered and balanced rights emanating from two
sections of the Indian Act. Section 12(1) (b) of the Act had the effect of
depriving a woman who married a non-Indian of her status as a registered
Indan. Yet section 11 (1) (f) which dealt with the situation where an Indian
man married a non-Indian woman placed the man under no corresponding
disqualification. The deciison of the majority of the court that s. 12(1) (b)
did not contravene the Bill of Rights reflected not so much a feeling that no
inequality which did exist was not of the type comprehended by section 1 (b)
of the CanadianBill of Rights. This latter position was presented by Ritchie,
J. who provided a new meaning for "equality before the law" as "equality of
treatment in the enforcement and application of the laws of Canada before
the law enforcement authorities and the ordinary courts of the land"." Despite the varying treatment by the Court of the issues in these two cases the
basic analyses in Lavell and Drybones are similar to the extent that in both
the court considered and balanced the rights emanating from two sectors of
legislation with the difference being that in Lavell the provisions were included in the same statute.
In Canard, the Court was faced with a situation where it seemed necessary to compare provisions of the Indian Act with provisions under provincial legislation in order to determine if there was inequality before the law.
This raised an important issue concerning the operation of the Bill of Rights.
Could rights emanating from provincial law be balanced against rights under
federal law to determine if an inequality existed? If not, was there another
method of comparison which would enable the Court to apply the Bill of
Rights in situations similar to that in Canard?The two methods of comparison employed in Drybones and Lavell were not suited to the Canard situation. At issue, therefore, was whether a third legitimate method of comparison existed.
Although the court divided five to two on the third issue of this case in
favour of the view that section 1 (b) did not render section 43 and the Indan
Estates Regulations inoperative, nevertheless it is possible to delineate three
general approaches to the Bill of Rights' issues which arose in Canard. The
first is that of Laskin, C.J. in dissent, who adopts but enlarges upon the
reasoning of Dickson, l.A. in the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The second
approach is that of Richie, J. reflecting the earlier legacy of Lavell. Finally,
there is the approach of Beetz, J. who although agreeing in result with the
'0 R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282; 10 C.R.N.S. 334; [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355; 9
D.L.R. (3d) 473; 71 W.W.R. 161.
"A.G. Can. v. Lavell; Isaac et al. v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; (1973) 38 D.LR.
(3d) 481; 23 C.R.N.S. 197.
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majority, nevertheless comes to a position on some of the issues remarkably
close to that of Laskin, C.J.
C.
Since the judgment of Laskin, C.J. closely reflects the reasoning of the
judgment in the Manitoba Court of Appeal, it is useful to first examine Dickson, J.A.'s treatment of the Bill of Rights' issue before proceeding to analyze
Laskin, C.J.'s approach.
Dickson, J.A. was acutely aware of the difficulty posed by the apparent
need to make a comparison between federal and provincial legislation in
Canard.Yet, he was of the opinion that section 43 of the Indian Act did deny
Mrs. Canard equality before the law. He expressed his concept of "equality
before the law" by citing Ritchie, J.'s statement in Drybones that "equality
before the law ...means at least that no individual or group of individuals
is to be treated more harshly than another under the law's Dickson, J.A.'s
judgment was rendered before the Supreme Court decision in Lavell in which
Ritchie, J. apparently altered his previous definition of "equality before the
law". One can only speculate as to whether Dickson, J.A.'s decision would
have differed if it had been rendered after Lavell, since he, of course, did
not sit when Canardcame before the Supreme Court although he was a member of the Court at that time.
The basis for Dickson, J.A.'s decision seems to lie with his feeling that
Mrs. Canard was being treated more harshly under the federal law than a
non-Indian woman who enjoyed a right, he presumed, under provincial law
to administer the estate of her husband. In effect, she was denied equality
because the law had deemed her inferior to other Canadians solely on the
basis of her race.
Dickson, J.A. attempted to avoid the problem of having to compare
federal with provincial legislation by setting up a comparison between the
legislative intention expressed by section 43 of the Indian Act and that contained in section 1 (b) of the Bill of Rights. He expressed the first of these in
the form of an imaginery statement made by Parliament: "because you are
not an Indian you shall not administer the estate of your late husband". On
the other hand, the Bill of Rights, he felt, "proclaimed an egalitarian doctrine" assuring Mrs. Canard of the right to equality before the law without
discrimination by reason of race.' 3
Thus, Dickson, l.A. felt that the inequality did not arise from a conflict
between federal and provincial legislation. Rather, it arose as the result of a
conflict between the intent of the CanadianBill of Rights and the contrary
intent of a federal statute.
Laskin, C.J. found in Dickson, J.A.'s judgment a new approach to the
problem of the operative effect of section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights. He
2

1

Supra, note 10 at 297 (S.C.1.); 346-47 (C.R.N.S.); 365 (C.C.C.); 484 (D.L.R.);
3 Supra, note 8 at 20, 23 (D.L.R.); 688, 691 (W.W.R.).
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agreed with Dickson, J.A.'s view that section 1 (b) was a guarantee against
which other statutes could be measured directly. This, he felt, avoided the
need of always having to test the operation of section 1 (b) by comparing two
or more pieces of federal legislation with one another to see if they were in
conformity as to the rights accorded to different classes or groups of people
in respect of the same subject matter.
To illustrate his point, Laskin, C.J. took the example of Drybones and
inquired as to the possible result if no liquor ordinance defining the rights of
non-Indians had ever existed in the Northwest Territories. In such a situation
there would have been no federal statute against which section 94(b) of the
Indian Act could have been compared. Laskin, C.J. felt that this fact should
make no difference and that it was the existence of the prohibition itself in
the Indian Act which constituted the denial of equality before the law. There
was no need for a touchstone of comparison in any other federal legislation.
Similarly, Laskin, C.J. felt that any consideration of provincial legislation was
irrelevant in the circumstances of Canard although he did not preclude the
use of provincial legislation for comparison purposes at some future occasion.
Instead, Laskin, C.J agreed with Dickson, IA. that the provisions of the
Indian Act and Regulations dealing with intestacy operated prohibitively
against Mrs. Canard on the basis of her race and consequently were in violation of 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. He altered the decision of
Dickson, J.A. by declaring only the Regulations to be inoperative and directed
that section 43 be interpreted and applied in conformity with the Canadian
Bill of Rights.'4
A major difficulty with the approach developed by Laskin, C.J. and
Dickson, J.A. is that it does not seem to successfully avoid the necessity of
making some sort of initial comparison as the basis for a test of "inequality"
even when a direct comparison is made between a single provision of federal
legislation and section 1 (b) of the CanadianBill of Rights. The idea of an
"inequality before the law" implies the existence of a norm against which an
impugned law can be measured. Laskin, C.I seemed to recognize this in his
decision when he stated:
Of course, it is much easier for the Courts to apply the Canadian Bill of Rights

to a federal legislative measure if Parliament itself provides a touchstone of
comparison in other federal legislation. Yet, it may equally provide measure
under challenge. 15
Thus, Laskin, C.I. seems to indicate that while there is no reason why a touch14 The underlying reason for this alteration by Laskin CJ. of Dickson J.A.'s judgment can perhaps be found in the following statement from Laskin C.J.'s dissent in
R. v. Burnshine, [1975] S.C.R. 693 at 714; (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584 at 599; [1974]
4 W.W.R. 49 at 65:
It is important to appreciate that the Canadian Bill of Rights does not invariably
command a declaration of inoperability of any federal legislation affected by its
terms.... The primary function of the Bill ... is to determine whether a challenged measure is open to a compatible construction that would enable it to
remain an effective enactment.
15Supra, note 1 at 561 (D.L.R.); 14 (W.W.R.).
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albeit as a state of nature, or, one

Despite his assertion that provincial law in Canard is an irrelevant factor
to be considered, the prohibitive terms of the Indian Act would not result in
inequality before the law if a provincial law subjected non-Indians to the
same prohibitions. Laskin, C.P.'s conclusion that Mrs. Canard was deprived
of equality before the law appears, necessarily, to have been based on an
implicit comparison of section 43 of the Indian Act with the provincial law
governing the rights of non-Indians in respect of the administration of estates.
Unfortunately, Laskin, C.i. does not examine the source of the wife's presumed right to administer the estate of her deceased husband in depth and
consequently the norm inherent in his comparison does not emerge. Only
Beetz, J. undertakes a detailed examination of this "right"as part of his analysis, largely because he bases his analysis on a different method of comparison.
D.
The approach of Ritchie, J. can generally be considered to represent the
positions of Pigeon and Martland, JI. In his judgment, Ritchie, J. clearly asserted that section 1 (b) of the CanadianBill of Rights did not contemplate
that a right under federal law could be compared with a right under provincial
law. He was most concerned with the "whittling away" effect which he felt
the Bill of Rights would have upon any piece of federal legislation if an inequality could be measured in that manner. 16
This effect would occur, Ritchie, J. feared, as the inevitable consequence
of comparing a federal right with an analogous provincial right under provincial law since there would almost always be some difference between the
federal and the provincial laws. The ultimate result would be, in effect, to
repeal the Indian Act. He based this view on two arguments which are stated
briefly in his judgment.
First, Ritchie, J. felt that section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights was designed
to guarantee equality before the law exclusively in respect of laws passed
under federal jurisdiction. Thus, he recognized the validity of comparing two
federal statutes or the provisions of a single federal statute as part of a test
for inequality. But this, he felt, should be the limit of the scope of comparison
and it was an improper extension of section 1 (b) to measure a right established under federal law against a right recognized under provincial law.
Secondly, Ritchie, J. restated the argument which he advanced in Lavell
to the effect that the Bill of Rights must be interpreted to be consistent with
the B.N.A. Act. He developed this proposition by referring to the preamble
of the Bill of Rights which states that the guarantees contained therein were
enacted so as to "reflect the respect of Parliament for its constitution". As a
result, Ritchie, J. concluded that the Court was bound to recognize that section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act gives Parliament legislative authority to pass
laws which treat Indians differently from other citizens in the various prov10 Id.
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inces. In other words, Ritchie, J. felt that the Bill of Rights could not be
construed in such a way that it became a fetter on the legislative authority
expressly granted Parliament under section 91 (24).
Laskin, C.J.'s rebuttal to this latter position was to assert that the power
to discriminate does not necessarily inhere in a grant of legislative authority.' 7
Furthermore, as Laskin, C.J. pointed out, nothing prevents Parliament, if it
so desires, from protecting the Indian Act from the operation of the Bill of
Rights simply by enacting that the Act shall have force notwithstanding the
provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights.'8
The arguments advanced by Ritchie, I., and especially his fear of the
"whittling away" effect, appear to be based upon an assumption that no reasonable discrimination qualification should be applied as a means of justifying
certain inequalities in the face of section 1 (b). Yet, this view seems to have
been repudiated in the Burnshine case in which a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized the validity of the reasonable discrimination
qualification as the basis for its decision.' 9 In that case, Ritchie, J. concurred
in the majority decision written by Martland, J.
Burnshine concerned sections 150 and 151 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act. 20 These provisions authorize a court in British Columbia to impose, in addition to the regular definite sentence for a crime, an indeterminate
sentence of not more than two years less one day to be served at a rehabilitative institution rather than a prison. The application of the provision was
restricted to juvenile offenders. The difficulty with the provision was that the
combination of the definite and indeterminate terms could exceed the maximum term for the offence stipulated by the CriminalCode. In addition, except
for a similar term extending the same authority to courts in Ontario, no
authority to impose indeterminate sentences was given the courts of any
other province. The counsel for Burnshine consequently argued that section
150 should be declared inoperative because it authorized a court in British
Columbia to impose upon Burnshine a sentence greater than that which could
have been imposed upon him by courts in the other provinces of Canada for
the same offence.
Martland, J. looked at the legislative purpose of section 150 and concluded that it was not enacted to impose a harsher penalty upon juvenile
offenders in B.C., but rather was designed to benefit these persons as part
of a rehabilitation program. The reason that these provisions only applied
in B.C. and Ontario, he stated, reflected the fact that the other provinces
17Id.

at 557 (D.L.R.); 9-10 (W.W.R.).

18 1d. at 558 (D.L.R.; 10 (W.W.R.). For a full critique of Ritchie J.'s B.N.A. Act
argument see, for example, P.W. H-ogg, A.G. Can. v. Lavell-commentary (1974), 52
Can. Bar Rev. 263; W.S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Supreme
Court Decisions in Lavell and Burnshine: The Retreat from Drybones to Dicey (1974),
7 Ottawa L. Rev. 1; as well as W. S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights,
(Second Edition Revised), (Toronto: 1975, McCleland & Stewart).
' 9 Supra, note 14.
20
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-21.
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lacked suitable reform institutions and facilities. Consequently, he concluded
that in enacting section 150 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, Parliament was seeking a "valid federal objective".
It is interesting to see that, while concurring in the reasons given by
Ritchie, 1. in Canard,Martland, J. also applied his earlier approach in Burnshine when considering section 43 of the Indian Act. However, he did this
merely by acknowledging that "there are legitimate reasons of policy for the
enactment of such provisions .. ." without any attempt to outline the nature
of these policy reasons.21
In the light of Burnshine the "whittling away" effect which Ritchie, J.
fears seems more apparent than real. If a valid federal objective can provide
a basis for excusing certain inequalities which may arise between two pieces
of federal legislation, then there should be an analogous basis for excusing
some inequalities which arise whenever federal legislation is compared with
provincial law. When Ritchie, J. states that "the inequality referred to (in
Canard) must of necessity be created because of the differences existing
between the law of Canada ... and the provincial laws ... '*, he is really
delineating a possible reasonable case in suggesting that all such federal legislation set in contra-distinction to provincial legislation would be rendered
inoperative by the Bill of Rights. There need be no "whittling away" effect
where the operation of section 1 (b) can be tempered with a reasonable discrimination qualification. Yet Ritchie, J. gives no indication of the reason why
he is prepared to accept the existence of reasonable types of discrimination
when federal legislation is being compared to determine if there is inequality
and not in situations where provincial law may be a factor.
If not all inequality created by federal law is to be considered in violation
of the guarantee of "equality before the law", then there should be no great
objection to using provincial legislation as the touchstone of comparison
where this appears to be necessary. The Court should be concerned not with
the fact of inequality but with the effect of inequality. Its inquiry, as evidenced
by the judgments of Laskin, C.J., Dickson, J.A., and Beetz, J., should be
directed at determining whether the class of persons affected by one law is
treated more harshly that the class of persons affected by the other law and
for not sufficient reason.
E.
Probably the most interesting discussion of the issues in Canardis found
in the judgment of Beetz, J. He began his analysis of the problem in Canard
by defining two specific issues to be determined. The first was "whether the
vesting in the Minister of certain parts of the administration of the Indian
Act, of itself, creates some inequality incompatible with the CanadianBill of
Rights". Secondly, he asked, "whether, in this particular case, the Indian Act
has actually been administered in conformity with the principles of the Canadian Bill of Rights.' '23
21

Supra, note 1 at 561 (D.L.R.); 14 (W.W.R.).
1d. at 563 (D.L.R.); 15-16 (W.W.R.).
231d. at 577 (D.L.R.); 32 (W.W.R.).
22
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This narrow definition of the issues reflected Beetz, J.'s close attention to the actual wording of the impugned provisions of the Indian Act.
The intention of section 43, he determined, was to create a different forum
for the administration of Indian estates than that which would normally exist
in other testamentary causes. However, the creation of this special forum, he
concluded, did not of itself constitute a form of "undue discrimination".
His use of the concept of "undue discrimination" indicates that Beetz, J.
was prepared to apply some reasonable discrimination qualification to the
problem. He obviously had in mind some corresponding concept of "due" or
permissible discrimination which could justify a provision such as section 43
in the face of the Bill of Rights. The significant fact is that he was employing
this concept in the context of a comparison between federal and provincial
law.
Beetz, J.'s primary concern throughout this part of his analysis seemed to
be to distinguish between inequality arising from different forms of treatment
under the law and that arising from different standards of treatment. For instance, he could find nothing in the wording of sections 42 and 43 of the
Indian Act which would prevent the Mfinister from appointing an Indian
woman as the administrix of her husband's estate. Although surrogate jurisdiction was exercised differently under the federal law than under provincial
law, nevertheless there was nothing in the legislation itself to indicate that one
form of jurisdiction would ultimately work more harshly than the other.
Beetz, J., however, decided to probe more deeply than the mere wording
of the statute in order to determine if the standard of treatment was the same.
For this reason, he inquired as to whether there had been racial discrimination in the administration and application of the legislation. The necessity of
making this type of inquiry forced Beetz, J. to the inescapable conclusion
that "some reference to the standards of provincial laws and practices may be
unavoidable as there is no other basis of comparison... ".24 In other words,
Beetz, J.needed a norm against which to compare the rights upon intestacy
of those persons affected by the IndianAct and for that he looked to provincial
law.
Beetz, J.next faced the problem of determining this norm in the presence
of several provincial jurisdictions - each possibly with varying laws on intestacy. This difficulty was overcome with an imaginative solution. He proceeded to examine the provincial laws to see if there existed a general standard - "a sort of ius gentium"2 5 which could serve as the touchstone of his
comparison. This norm, he emphasized, in the case of a comparison involving
provincial legislation, should consist of a general standard derived from
features common to all or most of the provincial jurisdictions. Parliament is
not bound, acording to Beetz, J., to fulfill the impossible task of following all
provincial enactments and practices in order to comply with the Canadian
Bill of Rights.
241d. at
25

1d.

79 (D.L.R.); 33 (W.W.R.).
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Beetz, J.'s search for the general standard led him to examine the Manitoba Surrogate Court Act26 and the statute of 21 Henry VIII c. 5. He concluded that while a wife may have an "entitlement" under provincial law to
administer the estate of her deceased husband, this "entitlement" could not
strictly be considered a "right". Nevertheless, he felt that the entitlement did
have the colour of right and consequently no wife should be deprived of the
opportunity to administer her deceased husband's estate without good cause.
It was Beetz, J.'s opinion that the Minister, to whom the surrogate power had
been transferred from the courts, was under a duty to exercise the power judicially. Accordingly, he came to the conclusion that in the circumstances of
Canard the requirement of equality before the law at least caused a burden
to be placed on the government to indicate to the Court why Mrs. Canard
should not have been named the administratrix by the Minister of Indian
Affairs.
In addition, after examining the Indian Estates Regulations, Beetz, J.
concluded that they did seem to contemplate that the wife of a deceased
Indian would not likely be chosen administratrix of her husband's estate. For
this reason, he decided that he "would have great doubts as to whether the
Regulations were not pro tanto rendered inoperative by the CanadianBill of
&2 7
Rights.
It is hard to imagine how Beetz, J.could have come any closer to
declaring the Indian Estates Regulations inoperative. The reason he balked
at doing so may be because he did not feel it necessary to his ultimate decision.
This ultimate decision was based on a question of the Court's jurisdiction. Although Beetz, J.would have preferred to send the matter back to the
Minister for another determination, he found this to be impossible due to a
jurisdiction obstacle.
The Minister's determination under section 43 of the Indian Act must be
appealed to the Federal Court and from there to the Supreme Court.28 The
Supreme Court, sitting on appeal from a decision of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal could have given. 29 Thus, it could not render a decision which only
the Federal Court had jurisdiction to make unless the matter had come on
appeal from that Court. Consequently, Beetz, J.felt constrained that the only
course open to him was to declare the letters of administration issued to Mrs.
Canard from the Surrogate Court a nullity and allow the appeal.
F.
If the period of time which extends between the date when a case is
heard by the Supreme Court and the date when a decision is handed down
can be used as an indication of the degree of difficulty encountered by the
Court in making its decision, then Canard must have been a very difficult
2

0R.S.M. 1970, c.C290, s. 31.
Supra, note 1 at 582 (D.L.R.); 36 (W.W.R.).
28
See Indian Act R.S.C. 1970, C. 1-6, s. 47(1); and Federal Court Act S.C. 197172-73, s. 31.
29
0 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 s. S-19, s. 47.
27
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decision indeed. The case was heard before the Supreme Court in early
March, 1974 and the decision was finally rendered eleven months later, on
January 28, 1975. The judgments themselves reflect the difficulties which the
Court must have had in coming to its decision. On each of the three Bill of
Rights issues above the Court exhibited significant splits.
First, on the issue of placing a reasonable discrimination qualification on
the concept of inequality, the Court was divided. Beetz, J., Martland, J., and
Ritchie, J., with the apparent concurrence of Pigeon, J. and Judson, J., seemed
to accept the necessity for some type of reasonable discrimination qualification. Beetz, J. and Martland, J. were prepared to extend the application of
this qualification further to comparisons between rights under federal with
rights under provincial law. By so extending the application of the reasonable
discrimination qualification, the "whittling away" effect of the Canadian Bill
of Rights on federal legislation could be avoided, and the feasibility of comparisons between federal and provincial law as the basis for a test of inequality
enhanced. Laskin, C.J., with Spence, J. concurring, seemed to reject any
application of a reasonable discrimination qualification to the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.""
On the second issue of the appropriate method of comparison as the
basis of the test for inequality, Beetz, J. for the majority was the only member
of the Court prepared to measure the rights of a class under federal legislation
against a general standard of rights enjoyed under provincial legislation in
respect of the same subject matter by a different class of persons. Nevertheless, Laskin, C0J. seemed implicitly to be making the same kind of comparison
in his dissent.
Ritchie, J., Martland, J., and Pigeon, J. all rejected the possibility of
basing a test for inequality before the law on a direct comparison between
provincial and federal legislation. All three declined to concur in the reasons,
as opposed to the actual decision, given by Beetz, J.
Finally, on the issue of the meaning of "equality before the law", it
might have been expected in view of the apparent reversal in Lavell of his
previous position in Drybones that Ritchie, J. might have taken this opportunity to clear up some of the confusion. Instead, he made no reference whatsoever to the meaning of "equality before the law". Indeed, none of the judgments contain any attempt to tackle once again the problem of defining section 1 (b) of the Bill of Rights. Similarly, in another Supreme Court decision,
handed down on the same day as Canard in which section 1 (b) was an is3OSee Laskin J.'s (as he then was) dissent in Lavell, supra, note 11 at 1386
(S.C.R.); 510 (D.L.R.); 226 (C.R.N.S.):
Reference was made . . . to various judgments of the Supreme Court of the
United States to illustrate the adoption by that Court of reasonable classifications
to square with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and with due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Those cases have at
best a marginal relevance because the Canadian Bill of Rights itself enumerates
prohibited classifications which the judiciary is bound to respect.
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sue,8 ' no reference was made by Martland, J. on behalf of the Court to a
meaning for "equality before the law".
The failure in these two decisions 2 to reaffirm the narrow concept of
"equality before the law" employed by Ritchie, J. in Lavell seems to indicate
a weakening of its hold on the Court. Instead, the decisions of Laskin, C.J.,
Beetz, J., and Dickson, J.A. in the Manitoba Court of Appeal, exhibiting a
concern with "harshness" in the application of the law upon a defined class,
may indicate the formulation of a working concept of "equality before the
law" to be used in section 1 (b) cases. Consequently, the recent silence of the
Court on this issue may be a sign of an impending change in direction.
The continuing splits and lack of judicial consensus on fundamental issues involving the application of the CanadianBill of Rights raises another
broader question. Eleven years ago, D.A. Schmeiser summed up an assessment of the Bill in the following words:
What then, can we conclude about the Canadian Bil of Rights, its meaning,
importance, and effect? On the one hand, it must be recognized that it was carelessly drafted in incredibly feeble language, and that its true perspective has
never been presented to the general public. It is doubtful, for example, whether
it will stand up against specific positive enactments which are clear and ambiguous. It must also be recognized that our Courts have done little, if anything,
to vitalize the Bill; the cases so far are a hodge-podge of conflicting views.33

Despite the expectations raised by the Drybones decision in 1970, these
words remain largely true today. One is left to wonder, in light of the decision
in Canard, whether it is possible that a body of coherent law could ever
develop from a document such as the Bill of Rights. Perhaps now is the
time for Parliament to step in with amendments to rescue all the judges,
lawyers, law professors and students who must struggle continually with the
ambiguities and inconsistencies of this piece of legislation. A clear expression
of a Parliamentary intention which would eliminate even some of the uncertainty surrounding the application and effect of the Bill of Rights would
do much to insure that the rights which the Bill is designed to affirm remain
protected in the courts of the land.
Canard, then, is a baffling case, and much like Lavell, no clear ratio
emerges from the mix of opinions - only lingering questions. In the absence
of Parliamentary action, many of the unresolved issues arising from the application of section 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights appear likely to remain unresolved far beyond such time when another case struggles its way
up the judicial ladder into the Supreme Court of Canada.
s 8Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1975), 52 D.L.P. (3d) 383.
This case chiefly concerned the interpretation fo several sections of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, R.S.C. 1970, c."1-3 and s. 1 (b) was raised in a secondary argument. The
main significance of the decision on this point appears to be the upholding by the Court
of its Burnshine decision.
32 This is actually three decisions if the Morgenthalercase (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d)
361; 30 C.R.N.S. 209; 20 C.C.C. 449 is included where the application of s. 1(b) was
briefly considered.
A.3D. A. Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1964) at 52...

